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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with a prevailing assumption that basic goods are accessory to claims of 
justice.  Against such an assumption, the paper advances the idea that basic goods (the core 
of what I wish to call the sufficiency threshold) are fundamental as a matter of justice. The 
paper then addresses the question as to what is the elemental justifiability of a social 
minimum and how that relates to theories of justice, particularly to emerging theories of 
global justice. The arguments against the aforementioned assumption call upon the strengths 
of a general theory of justice already in place, namely, John Rawls’s theory of justice and the 
enriching response and criticism thereof—particularly David Miller’s theory of justice. 
Keywords: justice, global justice, basic goods principle, John Rawls, moral 
cosmopolitanism, David Miller 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cet article traite d'une hypothèse répandue selon laquelle les biens de base sont accessoires 
aux demandes de la justice. Contre une telle hypothèse, le papier avance l'idée que les 
produits de base (le noyau de ce que je veux appeler le seuil de suffisance) jouent un rôle 
fondamental en tant qu’enjeu de la justice. L’article aborde ensuite la question de la 
justification élémentaire d'un minimum social et de son rapport aux théories de la justice, en 
particulier pour les théories émergentes de la justice mondiale. Les arguments développés 
appellent à renforcer une théorie générale de la justice déjà en place, à savoir la théorie de 
John Rawls et de réponse critique proposée par David Miller. 
Mots clés : justice, justice globale, biens de base, John Rawls, cosmopolitanisme moral, 
David Miller 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper draws on the idea that the demands of global social justice are best captured by 
the requirement that everybody has enough to lead a decent life. This requirement lies at the 
core of the most salient theories of social justice and circumscribes global social justice. I 
shall call this central proposition the sufficiency threshold claim (ST hereafter).  The 
underlying issue can be set out as follows. In order for the ST claim to fully correspond to 
the demands of global social justice, it must be (1) a matter of social justice and (2) the 
particular demand of global social justice. The underlying claim is that global social justice 
cannot be simply an extension of domestic social justice and yet it has to have a significant 
connection to social justice. This paper in particular is concerned with the elements 
identifying ST with social justice, which means that the focus of the analysis is on (1) rather 
than on (2). 
For a number of contemporary theorists the relationship between ST and social justice is a 
closed matter. Andrea Sangiovanni (2007) at one point called attention to the “fact” that, 
whether one takes the internationalist, globalist, statist or cosmopolitan stance, there is a 
general agreement that securing the adequate minimum threshold to lead a decent life for 
everybody is a requirement of justice (2007: 4).  It does not seem so clear that there is a real 
consensus about this. The connection between ST and social justice may well seem obvious, 
but it is difficult to establish and still in need of clarification. It suffices to recall that there 
are influential philosophers such as Nagel (2005) who strongly disagree with this thesis and 
whose objections are not necessarily easy to refute – not to mention a complete trend of 
thought such as libertarianism, whose opposition to the very idea of social justice in the form 
of positive rights and duties challenges this alleged consensus.  I think that more needs to be 
said in order to make the case for ST and to provide a justification of basic goods as a matter 
of justice—let alone global justice. What is more, there is more to do in order to bring to full 
consciousness the convergence Sangiovanni seems to recognize. Such is precisely the 
general aim of this paper. 
There is a prevailing assumption that basic goods are accessory to claims of justice. The 
contrasting thesis I advocate is that the content of the sufficiency threshold (basic goods at its 
core) is fundamental as a matter of justice. The notion of ST, I argue, is conceptually 
connected to the notion of basic goods (or basic needs). The arguments against the 
aforementioned prevailing assumption call upon the strengths of a general theory of justice 
already in place, namely, Rawls’s theory of justice and the enriching response and criticism 
thereof—particularly Miller’s theory of justice.  As explained below, this paper seeks to 
draw on these particular theories to support the ST claim. 
It seems politically and morally relevant to set out the very idea of the sufficiency threshold 
separately from establishing the bundle of goods and, if tenable, the precise level where the 
sufficiency bars should be set. The point is that global justice should not be restricted to 
issues of quantities and distributive procedures; it is not purely about establishing or 
determining metrics and calculating goods, populations, life standards, etc. Global justice is 
about coming to terms with the fundamental demand for basic goods in the first place; it is 
about gaining awareness of the moral and political aberration in neglecting the very rationale 
of a decent existence for every human being on earth (a global minimum benchmark). 
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More specifically, the point is that we should first of all try to answer the question as to what 
is implied in the notion of a sufficiency threshold, or in more familiar terms, to answer the 
question as to what is the elemental justifiability of a social minimum and how that relates to 
theories of justice. This must be the first phase of the analysis because the question as to why 
we should look at a social minimum as a matter of justice is independent from (and a 
condition of) the question as to whether this minimum is too restrictive or too demanding as 
a matter of justice (some theorists – libertarians for the most part – would even reject the 
very idea of a social minimum from the start, independent from how demanding the social 
minimum may be). As already mentioned, this paper will draw on two influential lines of 
thought that are commonly used as the basis for the affirmation of the idea of justice (and the 
rejection of the idea of global justice).   
 
II 
 
It is worth stressing from the outset that ST entails not only basic goods as such but also a 
qualitative dimension in basic goods.  If we talk about ST solely in terms of basic goods, 
then there is the danger of missing the fact that goods in themselves (if there are truly such 
things) are nothing but elements that create a condition of life.1 Similarly, if we talk about 
ST solely in terms of a standard, it becomes too loose and ambiguous as an approach: only 
when a standard contains a strict account of the goods does it have a reasonably objective 
meaning. ST should thus be the combination of these two elements; and a full account of it 
consists in specifying which goods are to be taken within the bundle of basic goods and what 
standard is brought about in the inclusion or exclusion of each one of the considered goods.  
Setting aside the specific content of ST, allow me to address the very idea of basic goods.2  
Basic goods are fundamental in an uncontroversial sense.  It needs no proof that without 
basic goods such as water, clean air, food, or shelter it would be impossible to lead a life.  
But here is the controversial element of the claim:  basic goods are fundamental as a matter 
of justice. 
For one thing, basic goods – and all goods for that matter – are fundamental in virtue of their 
social-relational character.  Their value is given in socio-historical contexts and in the 
context of socio-institutional interaction.  Evidently, basic goods matter for what they simply 
are (what matters to someone who is starving is some food, or what matters to someone who 
“lives” on the streets is proper shelter).  Nonetheless, in this general description, goods are 
valuable mostly because they are, in Michael Walzer’s words, “the crucial medium of social 
                                                 
1
 The charge of fetishism might rightly be made here if the sufficiency threshold is reduced to objects. 
2
 This doesn’t mean that this is all there is to the idea of basic goods in relation to the idea of justice. 
We should see in detail what is required to have a really balanced bundle of basic goods in order to 
thoroughly account for this and for the idea of global justice. It suffices to say at this point that basic 
goods can be understood minimally as subsistence goods (basic vital resources such as food and 
shelter) or less minimally as ‘larger’ or more elaborated goods that include health, education, political 
freedoms and socio-economic security. 
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relations” (Walzer: 1983, 7).3 Social interaction is not just interaction between individuals or 
collectives of different kinds, but it is also interaction with respect to goods that in turn 
become social in such a dynamic.4   
I maintain that the very fact of the social character of basic goods makes them fundamental 
as a matter of justice in virtue of this other truth: justice is relational.5 Let me put this claim 
in context.  Andreas Sangiovanni (2007) instructively points out that we can distinguish 
between relational and non-relational conception of justice.6  As he puts it, the former states 
that “[…] principles of justice cannot be formulated or justified independently of the 
practices they are intended to regulate” (2007: 5) whereas the latter “… reject the idea that 
content, scope, or justification of those principles depend on the practice-mediated relations 
in which individuals stand.” (2007: 6) 
The best instance of a non-relational account of justice can be found in Peter Singer’s ethical 
approach (clearly laid out in his very influential article “Famine, Affluence and Morality” 
(1972)).  Singer’s idea is that our moral duties are not fundamentally grounded on the 
relations we have with others but on the universal value of humanity and the universal moral 
duty that we all share as human beings.  Although the basic intuition of this conception of 
justice is shared by many political philosophers (especially the advocates of moral 
cosmopolitanism), the non-relational stance is exceptional (even among many cosmopolitans 
philosophers such as Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz who defend a type of moral 
universalism).  Note however that I do not intend to make a conclusive case for debate here 
or to expand on the opposition between the relational and non-relational viewpoints. 
                                                 
3
 Michael Walzer (1983) proposed a theory of goods in which the simplistic approach of justice — 
“people distribute goods to (other) people” — is improved by a socially more complex understanding 
of distributive matters.  My approach shares this same idea of goods as social and relational goods; 
however, it does not share two of his central claims, namely that (1) the ‘socialisation of social goods’ 
is restricted to closed political communities and that (2) “there is no single set of primary or basic 
goods conceivable across all moral and material worlds” (1983: 8). 
4
 As platitudinous as it may appear, this stance is not devoid of controversy.  It suffices to recall 
Nozick’s libertarianism (and some versions of liberal individualism) where individuals are assumed as 
‘closed units’, making social life a simple aggregation of individuals (equally unitary), institutions, 
and objects all around. This is a misleading universalistic conception of ‘the individual’.  The claim 
about the social character of basic goods stands against this dubious universalism. The social character 
of (basic) goods might well be taken as a corollary of this other general claim about the social nature 
of our existence. 
5
 Note that I keep untouched the distinction between basic and non-basic goods at this stage (needless 
to say, a relevant specific area of concern in the current theories of justice and theories of human 
rights).  It is true that the meaning of goods (or what they represent) depend upon a wide variety of 
aspects of social life: the socio-historical context, the cultural context, the specific conditions where 
those goods are produced, distributed, claimed for, etc. And it is true that this plurality makes the very 
definition of basic goods a difficult one (as we will discuss in detail below).  Nonetheless, it is also 
true that, in any case, goods are grounded on social interaction. The point I am trying to make is on 
the connection between the fact of basic goods as grounded on social interaction and relational 
conceptions of justice. 
6
 The other distinction Sangiovanni stresses relates to the question of the scope of justice.  This is the 
discussion about whether justice should be understood strictly within the limits of nation-states or 
whether one might claim that there is a global dimension over demands of justice (2007, 6-7). 
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For the non-relational case it suffices to highlight the fact that, although such a line of 
argument does not utilise the language of social justice strictly speaking, it does support the 
demand to ensure that every person should have access to basic goods. In addressing Andrew 
Kuper’s criticism, Singer makes clear his fundamental claim, namely that “failure of people 
in the rich nations to make any significant sacrifices in order to assist people who are dying 
from poverty-related causes is ethically indefensible” (2002b: 128).  Singer’s case – which is 
made by a utilitarian-minded thinker who is trying to make a case about “the obligation to 
assist the world’s poorest people” without relying “on utilitarian premises for that argument” 
(2002b: 128) – is ultimately supporting the view that having access to the basic goods to live 
a minimum decent life is at the core of any moral demand independently of whether we call 
it a matter of justice and independently of the grounds on which justice is invoked.7 
Having said this, I maintain that the general case of the ST claim and the particular sub-claim 
that ST is a matter of social justice should be made along the lines of the relational 
conception. The two theses I endorse—justice as relational and goods as grounded on social 
interaction – precisely encompass such a framework.  Of course, this is not to say that the 
relational approach has resolved the crucial disagreements on global justice.  Evidently, it is 
on the “details” of the relational account where some of the more pressing contentions 
appear.   And yet, as I see it, there is a very telling common terrain where some of the 
contrasting views on global justice possibly overlap; this is the terrain of the sufficiency 
threshold claim.  
There are two recognizable contrasting trends of thought whereby the relational bases of 
justice are commonly defended, namely cultural or social meanings and “the nature of shared 
social and political institutions” (Sangiovanni, 2007, 5).  We can call these the cultural and 
institutional interpretations, and these two trends are best portrayed in David Miller and John 
Rawls respectively. Independently of the doubts and challenges that these philosophers pose 
to the idea of global justice – or, what is more, even considering that these philosophers are 
somehow sceptical about global justice – the relevant point is that they can constantly and 
consistently be brought in to defend the very idea that basic goods are a fundamental matter 
of justice.  In what follows I will lay out some of the most important claims (particularly 
those of Miller) and then argue for the central role that basic goods (especially what may be 
called the basic goods principle) play within Rawls’s general theory of justice. 
 
III 
 
Consider the line of thought of David Miller. The relational aspect of his conception of 
justice is clearly delineated by his commitment to the ethical significance of nationality.  
Indeed, Miller’s idea of ethical agency is substantively reliant upon the very fact of 
individuals already embedded in social relationships. 
                                                 
7
 In a recently published book called The Life You Can Save (2009) Peter Singer defends once again 
his general argument focusing on the moral responsibility that everyone has to help those in need. 
Singer is more interested in the case of private charity rather than in political-institutional action.  On 
the issue of responsibility in particular, see Miller 2007, Chapter 9. 
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In his very influential book On Nationality, Miller (1995) defends a contextual 
understanding of justice.  Miller believes that nations are the socio-cultural and political 
locus of justice.  The idea of justice is rooted, in his view, in “communities of obligation” 
and the demands for social justice (the demands of basic goods) are fundamentally observed 
in the demands of nationality: “Nations are communities of obligation, in the sense that their 
members recognize duties to meet their basic needs and protect the basic interests of other 
members” (1995: 83).  For Miller, one strong reason for favouring what he calls “the 
principle of nationality” (1995: 2) is precisely the justification (legitimacy) and possible 
realization of the ideals of social justice.  According to this view, justice “appears” in the 
articulated relation among individuals within their socio-cultural and institutional milieu and 
social goods are recognizable therein. Mutual commitment, shared history, shared beliefs, 
territory and a collective sense of goods and of the meaning of social goods and institutions 
(“the elements of nationality”) are the grounds for the demand of securing social goods 
(2005: 27). 
I am not discussing here Miller’s defence of ethical particularism and the way he 
understands ethical universalism, nor will I take a stance in regard to his views against 
cosmopolitanism at this stage.  All I am saying is that Miller’s approach instructively draws 
upon the relational character of justice and the relevance of basic goods. Schematically put, 
Miller (1) endorses the fundamental connection between the demands of justice and the 
demands for securing basic goods (the sufficiency threshold) and, closer to the idea of global 
justice, (2) recognizes a universal obligation to protect basic rights (1995: 75), stressing the 
positive obligation to protect basic rights not only of co-members of political-cultural 
communities but also, at least in certain circumstances, of “outsiders”.  He puts it this way: 
“But if we take nationality seriously, then we must also accept that positive obligations to 
protect basic rights (e.g. to relieve hunger) fall in the first place on co-nationals, so that 
outsiders would have strong obligations in this respect only where it was strictly impossible 
for the rights to be protected within the national community” (1995: 79). 
To further strengthen the case, let me briefly put forward a couple of relevant points closely 
related to the idea of the social character of basic goods from two of his influential later 
books. In Principles of Social Justice (1999) Miller positively engages with the idea of social 
justice through a more detailed exposition of his contextualist approach. The social-relational 
character of justice (or justices) is  defended here through a threefold typology of human 
relationships: solidaristic community, instrumental association, and citizenship, (1999: 26). 
Again in the same way as his nationalistic account mentioned above, this approach to social 
justice is controversial. Irrespective of that, however, the relevant point for our theme is that 
Miller instructively argues about how basic goods (through his analysis of basic needs) are 
relational and how they call on social justice rather than on plain humanitarianism.8  Here 
Miller emphasises the strong and crucial connections between basic goods and justice (basic 
goods as “justice-relevant goods”).  
                                                 
8
 Miller takes an indirect route (considering the reasons offered for thinking about needs as a principle 
of justice) because he “does not know what could be said to someone who claims that needs have 
nothing to do with justice…” (1999: 221).  
Global Justice   
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 10(2), 2013   
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
 
17 
This stance is clearly stated in what he calls “the need principle” and the thesis that it is a 
principle of social justice (1999: 204, 221).9  Miller makes the case for the need principle by 
highlighting the problems that occur when claims of need are treated as humanitarian (1999: 
222-25) and arguing that claims of need are not generally parasitic on other claims such as 
entitlement or merit—or, positively stated, that the need principle stands independently of 
other principles such as entitlement or merit (1999: 225-227). 
In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Miller further 
strengthens his case of basic goods as a matter of justice.  Here Miller develops a very 
insightful yet controversial theory of global justice, introducing strong contrasts between 
social justice, global justice and distributive justice (2007: 12-17).  He also posits the thesis 
of the particularly “unique” (or exclusive) relation between citizenship, social justice and 
what he calls societal needs (2007: 15, 167,182).  Setting aside for the moment all of the 
above crucial notions (particularly the ones that make him reject the social in the idea of 
global justice), I wish to call attention specifically to chapter 7 where the centrality of basic 
goods is clearly stated. 
Very much in the way I think one can explain and argue for global justice and the sufficiency 
threshold, Miller presents his theory of basic human rights in search of “… a list of rights 
that can specify a global minimum that people everywhere are entitled to as a matter of 
justice” (2007: 166).  In his approach to human rights, Miller uses what he calls a 
“humanitarian strategy” (not to be confused with humanitarianism) that directly appeals to 
basic human needs (2007: 179).  Human rights are thus justified in terms of needs that are 
assumed as essential, morally urgent, and required to avoid harm (biological and social). 
Human rights are also strictly justified in terms of the provision of a minimum of decency 
for everybody to develop their own life plans (2007: 180-181), or to exercise what he later 
calls “core human activities” (2007: 184).   
IV 
 
Consider, on the other hand, the case of John Rawls, unsurprisingly the main theoretical 
interlocutor in contemporary theories of justice. In Rawls’s political philosophy, the 
relational aspect of justice is given in several interconnected theses about individuals, 
societal life, political institutions and moral principles.  Take for instance Rawls’s familiar 
idea that the basic structure of society is the subject of justice (1971: 7-10). The basic 
structure alludes to the major political, economic and social institutions that govern society – 
the constitution, competitive market, rules governing private property, and so on – taken 
together as one “scheme” (“the social system as a whole” (1971: 50)). The basic structure, so 
understood, not only determines people’s lives in terms of how those institutions affect 
people’s access to (basic) goods, which is indeed the main reason for the fundamental 
character of goods to the theory of justice as discussed later in this chapter, but also, and to a 
                                                 
9
 Note that Miller understands ‘needs’ as ‘intrinsic needs’.  This supposes that ‘needs’ in the need 
principle should not be assumed as merely instrumental, but as what Mill also recognizes under the 
terms ‘fundamental’ and ‘categorical’ (1999: 206).  Later on Miller says that “[..] needs could be 
identified as those conditions that allowed people to lead a minimally decent life in their societies” 
(Ibid: 210).  
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large extent, it is the expression of the interconnectedness of social existence. It is in this 
nexus of social interconnectedness that social justice and a conception of basic goods arises.  
Consider another more specific aspect of Rawls’s theory of justice such as the lexical order 
of principles of justice.10  In a very instructive passage of the first chapter of Political 
Liberalism (“Fundamental Ideas”) John Rawls ([1993] 2005) succinctly refers to the 
likelihood of a lexically prior principle “requiring that citizen’s basic needs be met” (2005, 
7). This is not a minor concession Rawls makes to Rodney Peffer’s insights (developed in 
Marxism, Morality and Social Justice (1990)).  It indeed gives room to some relevant 
qualifications of his general theory of justice, supporting the claim that the core of social 
justice lies in ST. 
The thrust of Peffer’s conception of morality and justice, sympathetic both to Marx and 
Rawls, is precisely the claim that the provision of basic goods is a matter of justice. Peffer 
proposes a “[…] minimum floor principle explicitly stipulating that no one will be allowed 
to fall below a certain level of well-being” (1990: 14). Such a principle modifying Rawls’s 
theory of justice reads, in the simplest form, that “everyone’s security rights and subsistence 
rights shall be respected” (1990: 418), and in the more elaborated form, it reads as follows: 
“Everyone’s basic security and subsistence rights are to be met: that is, everyone’s physical 
integrity is to be respected and everyone is to be guaranteed a minimum level of material 
well-being including basic needs, i.e., those needs that must be met in order to remain a 
normally functioning human being (Ibid).” 
In acknowledging Peffer’s “basic rights principle” (as he calls it), Rawls takes on board this 
truth: basic goods are at the core of the theory of social justice. The question still remains, 
however, as to which arguments can be offered to this effect. Peffer’s own defence is 
somehow wanting. Peffer acknowledges one objection and gives two reasons for including 
his basic rights principle in a theory of justice. Succinctly put, the objection is that this 
principle goes beyond the institutional context of social cooperation (its scope is broader 
than the theory of justice (1990: 421). He counters this by pointing to the economic 
interdependency of today’s world.  This is also his first reason for his basic rights principle. 
He adds a second reason, namely people’s “tendency to overlook or downgrade its 
importance” (Ibid).  Although I agree with Peffer’s rationale, I think these two justifications 
are not enough to support it. Economic international interdependency, a factual premise, 
does not trigger the normative premise of the basic rights principle. What people tend to 
recognize or not does not take us far towards the justification of such principle or any other 
principle for that matter.  
As for Rawls’s arguments for incorporating the satisfaction of basic needs as a lexically prior 
principle, it is necessary to look further in his general theory of justice since he does offer 
direct arguments to this effect. In Political Liberalism (PL hereafter), Rawls addresses the 
theoretical challenge of finding a shared basis (or of a narrower scope of disagreement) 
                                                 
10
 Recall that even though I am alluding here to principles of justice, the point is not about establishing 
a formal, perfectly distributive principle of global justice (my approach to global justice is meant to 
delineate a rather concrete and substantive stance as opposed to abstract and formalistic). The idea is 
to show how the concrete condition –having enough—counts as a matter of justice.  It is my 
contention that rather than searching for a unifying principle of global justice we better look at a 
unifying object of global justice. 
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regarding the “most appropriate family of institutions to secure democratic liberty and 
equality” (PL: 8). It is not an onto-sociological work but a political-philosophical one, and it 
is therefore not surprising that Rawls pays less attention to the socio-political basics of those 
, as his aim is to examine the political-institutional guidelines of liberal democracies.  And 
yet Rawls still makes this statement about basic goods (more closely related to the socio-
political) that sheds light on the claim that basic goods are a matter of justice.  Rawls says: 
“Finally, as one might expect, important aspects of the principles are left out in the brief 
statement as given.  In particular, the first principle covering the equal basic rights and 
liberties may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens’ basic 
need be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand and to 
be able fruitfully to exercise those rights and liberties” (PL: 7).   
The demand that basic goods be met (we may call it the basic goods principle) implies that 
(a) insofar as it is a principle (and not a simple collateral condition) it must be seen in 
harmony with his other principles (the liberty principle, the difference principle); the basic 
goods principle becomes a principle of justice in itself.  And (b), in leaving the basic goods 
principle aside (and yet recognizing its relevance) Rawls is showing that his political account 
is not exhaustive and that it might be enriched with a wider socio-political account of what 
the justice of societal interactions and institutions consists of. 
To invoke this lexically prior principle might appear as a contradiction to Rawls’s recurrent 
claim of the priority of the liberty principle over the difference principle. I think this is not 
the case.  I maintain that the priority of the liberty principle is not at odds with the 
fundamental condition of universal access to basic goods. The priority of the basic goods 
principle is slightly but significantly different from the priority of the liberty principle. 
In accordance with the early Rawls of TJ, the lexical priority of liberty applies only “once 
the required social conditions and level of satisfaction of needs and material wants is 
attained” (1999: 476). The “basic goods principle” captures precisely these “earlier” 
moments and the priority of liberty is applicable only after ensuring that such a level of 
satisfaction of basic needs (ST) is reached.  It is my understanding that there is no 
contradiction between these two ways of interpreting Rawls’s acceptance of the basic goods 
principle and the liberty principle. On the contrary, there is a complementary relation 
between these two principles that reinforces the fundamentally just character of basic goods. 
In accordance with the general view I am advancing in this paper, the liberty principle 
should be translated as a guiding principle whereas the “basic goods principle” should be 
translated as a grounding principle. Correlatively, I hold the view that the latter is more 
“instrumentally” political-institutional whereas the former is somewhat more densely socio-
political. 
The importance of the basic goods principle (the satisfaction of basic needs) in terms of 
justice is clearly seen in relation to matters of legislation and the constitution.  Rawls claims 
that the basic principle should be contemplated in the constitution of liberal democratic 
societies and enacted in legislation in virtue of its fundamental character of justice, in virtue 
of being what Rawls calls “the constitutional essentials”.  Rawls says: “[...] there must be 
legislation assuring freedom of association and freedom of movement; and beyond this, 
measures are required to assure that the basic needs of all citizens be met so that they can 
take part in political and social life. [And then he adds:] About this last point, the idea is not 
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that of satisfying needs as opposed to mere desires and wants; nor is it that of redistribution 
in favour of greater equality.  The constitutional essential here is rather that below certain 
level of material and social well-being, and of training and education, people simply cannot 
take part in society as citizens, much less as equal citizens” (PL 166).  Notice that Rawls 
does not take the difference principle to be a constitutional essential but does with the basic 
goods principle.  This constitutional power of the basic good principle proves its relevance as 
a matter of justice.  The duty to ensure that everybody has enough to participate in society as 
a free, equal and self-respecting citizen is a constitutional essential that should always be 
respected in democratic legislature; this is a duty of justice.11 
Some Rawlsian theorists might want to take the basic goods principle as a “pre-political” 
element outside the radar of the theory of justice as political.  I think that this interpretation 
is a misreading of Rawls’s general project.  A “well ordered” society’s institutional system 
includes, as a guiding principle, the very condition of its institutional sustainability, i.e., the 
necessary condition for all citizens to exercise their moral powers and pursue their life plans. 
The two moral power (as explicitly explained by Rawls in LP: 81) are the powers of free and 
equal persons that consists in the capacity to be reasonable (the capacity for a sense of 
justice) and the capacity to be rational (the capacity for a conception of the good) 
respectively.  I think that the basic goods principle is meant to ensure that citizens can 
develop and exercise their fundamental capacities (fundamental as a matter of justice)12 and 
that the universal access to basic goods (the fulfilment of basic needs) cannot be outside of 
the political.  What is more, this requirement of the fulfilment of basic goods is deeply socio-
political insofar as it is a condition of possibility of social existence. To infringe the 
institutional system for the sake of a social end (such as a demanding idea of welfare) is 
inadmissible in terms of the theory of (political) justice, but to infringe or even to put in risk 
the very condition of possibility of social existence by overlooking basic goods (the 
satisfaction of basic needs) is an even greater injustice. 
It is not hard to imagine basic goods as one element of the basic structure fostering social 
justice.  Or to put it in broader terms, it is reasonable to take basic goods as part of what 
Rawls recognizes as “the background of justice” (PL: 265-269). Rawls says: “The role of the 
institutions that belong to the basic structure is to secure just background conditions against 
which the actions of individuals and associations take place.  Unless this structure is 
appropriately regulated and adjusted, an initially just social process will eventually cease to 
be just, however free and fair particular transactions may look when viewed by themselves.” 
(PL: 266)  In my view, the institutionality that should be in place for securing that everybody 
                                                 
11
 Samuel Freeman (2007) instructively makes this point: “The difference principle is not a 
constitutional essential, as Rawls seems to suggest it is not a requirement of ‘basic justice’, so long as 
an adequate social minimum is provided” And then, in connection with the judiciary enforcement of 
this constitutional essential, Freeman adds: “Rawls thinks it is appropriate for the judiciary to enforce 
an adequate social minimum in the event that the legislative branch repeals or refuses to provide 
measures to meet the basic needs of the worst-off.  A social minimum … is a requirement of ‘basic 
justice’” (2007:234-35). 
12
 Rawls does not formulate these statements as a view of human nature or social theory, but as one of 
political philosophy that is mostly applied to citizens, within his political conception of justice as 
fairness.  I will not discuss the difficulties of this approach at this point. 
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has enough to lead a decent life (some of which one may see in many European welfare 
states) is grounded in justice in the sense described above. Basic goods are a substantive part 
of the required background of justice. Any transaction made by individuals or collectives and 
institutions should have in place the means and mechanisms to protect them. Those means 
and mechanisms (principles in this context of philosophical inquiry) protect the background 
of justice; and this amounts to protect basic goods through the adequate institutions of 
justice.   
Rawls takes up again the relevance of basic goods for the general theory of justice in The 
Law of Peoples (1999).  Let us recall that, as opposed to TJ and PL, where the focus of the 
analysis was on “closed systems” (on specific liberal democratic societies), The Law of 
Peoples (LP hereafter) deals with the principles that regulate this wider system of the society 
of peoples. Questions arise as to whether there is continuity in Rawls’s political philosophy 
between his conception of domestic justice and international justice.  I think there is 
continuity at least in relation to what one might take to be their grounds. It is not 
unreasonable to expect that, if basic goods are fundamental for reasons of justice in Rawls’s 
pre-LP, they also are to be observed as such in this particular conception of right and justice 
within what he calls “the society of peoples” (LP: 3). Many philosophers have argued that 
Rawls has philosophically betrayed his own general project of justice (allegedly already 
betrayed in PL).13  Others have found the unity of Rawls’s project precisely in PL.14 Most 
commentators (Rawlsian and anti-Rawlsian) have found LP unsatisfactory in many regards. 
I do not intend to replicate all of this here.  Independently of the criticism one might endorse 
to the overall Rawlsian strategy and the assumptions about globality or to his idea of a 
second original position and his social ontology (the typology of peoples), I think that we 
still can consistently get the blueprint of the role and place of basic goods in the just 
regulation of the interaction among “localized” socio-political communities or in wider 
interactional-institutional dynamics.  Note that I am not discussing Rawls’s particular 
conception of international justice at this stage either.  The idea here is to see whether basic 
goods belong in Rawls’s principles regulating the relations among societies and their 
governments (principles of international justice). 
 It is my contention that the qualification of basic goods as a matter of justice is confirmed in 
Rawls’s final work by means of two substantive aspects of his theory of (just) international 
relations, namely (1) the connection between justice, the Law of Peoples and human rights 
and (2) the duty of assistance (which might well be assumed as cosmopolitan in spirit, as 
discussed later in this study).  In the list of principles of justice among peoples, Rawls 
                                                 
13
 For an instructive summary of the criticism in this regard, see Leif Wenar’s “The Unity of Rawls’s 
Work” (2004: 265-67).  Wenar’s reconstruction of Rawls’s work is meant to show unity in light of the 
notion of legitimacy.  I think Rawls’s general theory of justice is best seen in light of the social 
minimum, rather than in this strong presumably correlative notion of legitimacy.  I address this 
particular contention only indirectly. 
14
 Samuel Freeman claims that Rawls’ account of the Law of People should be seen as an “essential 
part of Political Liberalism” (2007: 425).  This is a possible reading of Rawls’s last project, but it 
may undercut the whole idea of an account of justice wider than the domestic one.  If the idea is 
simply about what is just for a liberal democratic society to apply in its relation to other societies, this 
would just be partial and parochial (the undesired features of a just global order).  Of course, the 
alternative (an account of justice wider than domestic justice) is not necessarily cosmopolitan. 
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explicitly states these two aspects: “Peoples are to honor human rights” and “Peoples have a 
duty to assist other people living under unfavourable conditions…” (LP: 37).  And later on in 
his minimal list of human rights Rawls highlights the right to life, i.e. subsistence and 
security rights (LP: 65).  It is in the connections and compatibilities between these elements 
where the case for basic goods as fundamentally a matter of justice come into sight. 
There are three points making the case for basic goods as a matter of justice along the lines 
of Rawls’s LP.  Firstly, liberal and decent societies (the ones forming the “reasonably just 
society of well order peoples” (LP: 17)) are supposed to be fair “from within” as a pre-
condition for them to engage in a just international social contract.  Peoples in the society of 
peoples have to be already guided by this very principle of respect to human rights, and 
particularly to the right to life. This would be, in a way, the background of international 
justice (a global basic structure, however minimal). The right to life is manifested as this 
commitment of justice within societies that also has to be observed in the regulations or 
principles of international relations that grants legitimacy and justice to their associative 
commitments. This is thus a substantive continuous element of the general theory of justice.  
In this “double presence” the right to life becomes a constant: a single constraint (and 
demand) that should be considered in the two levels of interaction (the two social contracts) 
as a criterion of justice.  
Secondly, the constraint that the right to life (and human rights in general)15 imposes on 
nation-states is just in virtue of its being socio-political.  In this regard, adding perhaps more 
weight to human rights, I am taking them to be more than “a standard for the decency of 
domestic political and social institutions” (LP: 80).  The reason for this is that “the 
international social contract” becomes socio-political insofar as the agreements that peoples 
would be signing on, rather than being merely a standard, would amount to establishing 
legitimate laws shaping the corresponding institutions. Even though human rights are widely 
regarded as general moral rights (thus as a standard), it is true that their constant 
implementation in international law and institutions (their “operationalization”) amounts to 
their institutionalisation, however thin that may be.16  And this is a socio-political process in 
itself.17 In fact, the very observance of the Law of Peoples would inscribe them into such 
more institutionalized frameworks—which would be binding in virtue of Rawls’s principle 
number 2: “Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings” (LP: 37). 
Thirdly, Rawls’s account of the duty of assistance also makes the case for basic goods as a 
matter of justice. The duty of assistance (interestingly enough, an external duty, a duty 
                                                 
15
 In putting forward human rights and its role within the Law of Peoples, Rawls endorses the 
assumption of a post-Westphalian world (or, putting it in Ulrich Beck’s (2000) terms, the reality of the 
second modernity). The function of human rights significantly touches upon the limits of internal 
autonomy of nation-states (it is an external constrain to traditional sovereignty) and the limits over the 
intervention against other peoples (LP: 79). 
16
 For an instructive approach to human rights, see Allen Buchanan’s Justice, Legitimacy and Self-
Determination (2007), especially chapter 3.  For a detailed discussion on the possibility of turning 
basic rights into constitutional rights, see Cecile Fabré’s Social Rights under the Constitution (2000). 
17
 Note that a robust conception of human rights appeals to a balance between what these rights 
capture as political (insofar as they could be institutionally contemplated) and what they capture as 
social (insofar as they invoke peoples rather than states and social cohesion – in the form of pluralistic 
publicized tolerant stable societies – rather than an absolute conception of the sovereignty of states). 
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towards third parties)18 is justified in terms of the “justice-to-come” for the recipient 
societies (not in terms of pure compassion, although such is not necessarily a negative 
value).  Rawls clearly affirms this principle when he states: “People have a duty to assist 
other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent 
political and social regime” (LP: 73 emphases added).19  What can be more unfavourable 
than lacking the basic goods required for functioning as free and equal within particular 
polities? What might the duty of assistance so stated imply but the attribution of justice to 
actions and institutions that help a polity to establish a just socio-political regime?   
In general, to argue for the duty of assistance as a duty of justice (as Rawls seems to be 
consistently doing) not only reflects the thesis that there are substantive connections or links 
among all societies worldwide, but also nurtures the consequent demand for post-national 
institutions of justice. The demand for the sufficiency threshold observed in the case of 
justice within states seems to be equally demanded within the international arena. The duty 
of assistance and the right to life capture the lexically prior principle as explained earlier.  
This reveals the consistency and cogency of Rawls’s general theory of justice, which adds 
weight to the claim that basic goods or the satisfaction of basic needs are a fundamental 
matter of justice.20 
 
V 
 
Let me accentuate, by way of conclusion, the meaning of the term fundamental alongside the 
preposition of in the sentence “fundamental as a matter of justice”. There are several ways in 
which basic goods may be thought of as fundamental.  Firstly, they are fundamental in a 
non-controversial sense, as the sine qua non conditions of subsistence. Secondly, it is 
fundamental insofar as they are pre-conditions of justice. Here is where the debate takes 
place.  There is a strong and a weak sense of being a pre-condition of justice.  In the weak 
sense, deprivation of basic goods becomes unjust in virtue of the “neutralizing” effect it has 
                                                 
18
 This is interesting because the non-parties in the international agreement are non-parties only within 
the framework of the agreement, but certainly not from the point of view of the economic and 
institutional links they already have in ‘the real world’. There is sufficient empirical evidence that 
liberal and decent societies today (those who one might deem as such, i.e., the U.K, France, Germany, 
the U.S.A) interact with societies that very well classify as burdened societies mainly in terms of pure 
economic benefits, independently of the justice of their interaction in terms of political and social well 
justified morally stimulus. Besides, this apparently ‘non-party’ becomes a part once the 
implementation of the duty of assistance reveals the economic and institutional changes that such 
‘assistance’ requires within the domestic realm and the realm of legitimate international institutions.  
19
 Note the wide range of socio-political elements that are involved in this sentence.  As Rawls 
mentions (106-113) unfavorable conditions and assistance touch issues such as political culture 
(domination and oppression included), institutional designs, social cohesion, etc. 
20
 It is clear that the criticism of philosophers such as Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz regarding the 
relevant issue of the difference principle would only support my argument of the relevance of basic 
goods as a matter of justice.  The fundamental element of basic goods (the sufficiency threshold) is 
observed both in the duty of assistance and in the more demanding proposal of a global difference 
principle. 
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on principles of justice.  In this regard, if basic needs are not met, then this simply renders 
the entire theory of justice inapplicable.  On this account, basic goods are conceived as a 
requirement for justice. 
In the strong sense, it is necessary as a matter of justice that everybody has access to basic 
goods. Such an adequate standard, a sufficiency threshold, becomes an internal reason to 
justice. It is not just a material pre-condition, but a substantive pre-condition envisaged in the 
very theory of justice.  Simply put, basic goods are conceived as a requirement of justice.  
There is a third sense of fundamental that supports directly the sufficiency threshold claim. 
This is that basic goods might be thought of as fundamental in the sense that they entail 
global justice as such.  On this account, basic goods will be understood not only as a 
requirement of justice, but as the requirement of justice: what the justice of global justice 
particularly consists in. 
  Miller’s and Rawls’s theories of social justice, as discussed throughout the previous 
sections, envisage the second account (basic goods conceived as pre-conditions of justice); 
and even if sometimes they seem to favour the weak version (a requirement for justice), we 
may confidently claim that their overall theories incorporate the stronger version (a 
requirement of justice), or at least they are open to it. The sentence “a requirement of justice” 
also evokes the idea of radical thinking.  Reasons of justice are rooted in the fact about the 
absence of the security of a dignified life of “the many,” and that is an epistemological 
stance as well as an ethical-political one. 
Overall, I have examined the continuity of the essential role of basic goods in the still 
ongoing theorisation about justice. Basic goods are not only basic in the uncontroversial 
sense of being the starting point of individual and social existence, but they are also 
fundamentally a matter of justice. This is a very meaningful assertion with regard to global 
justice since we cannot make sense of global social justice unless it consists in ensuring that 
every person has enough to lead a decent life. 
In other words, if global justice is to be meaningful, it must robustly account for the rationale 
of justice as embedded in the quest for (universal) access to basic goods (it should at least 
illuminate the fundamentally just demand for securing basic goods, calling upon the 
satisfaction of basic needs as a matter of justice).  And in view of the fact of the early stages 
of formation of theories of global justice (and the correspondent global institutions), the least 
one can reasonably and rationally ask for is that basic goods (the satisfaction of basic needs) 
are acknowledged as the core of justice. To say that the demand for the sufficiency threshold 
best captures the demands of global justice is, in the first place, a thesis about the 
fundamentals of justice in its own right. 
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